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ABSTRACT 
 
This article argues that GINA theoretically protects people from genetic discrimination in 
insurance coverage and in employment; however, its true legacy will be assuring the American 
public that taking genetic tests will not invite sanctions from either insurance providers or 
employers. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
fter more than a decade of work and in one of the most significant scientific accomplishments in 
history, the Human Genome Project (HGP) announced in 2003 that it had mapped the entire human 
genome.
1
 Since the HGP started in the late 1980’s, knowledge of human genetics has grown 
exponentially, enabling scientists and doctors to develop and provide genetic tests for over 1500 conditions 
currently.
2
 These breakthroughs have helped to identify diseases in individuals as well as to assist doctors decide the 
best form of treatment.
3
 As is often the case, the medical developments and breakthroughs occurred in advance of 
policy developments to ensure beneficial administration of the medical technologies or protection of individual 
rights.
4
 In the mid-1990’s, some members of Congress became concerned about how some entities might use an 
individual’s genetic information in the absence of laws designed to protect an individual from discrimination based 
on the individual’s genetic information. Beginning in 1995, members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate began to develop and to attempt to pass legislation that would have severely limited how employers and 
insurers could obtain and use genetic information.
5
 The effort to protect individuals from discrimination based on 
their genetic information culminated this year with the passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 (GINA), a bipartisan effort designed to prevent insurers from underwriting and employers from making 
employment decisions based on genetic information.
6
 Heralded by Senator Kennedy as “the first civil rights bill of 
the new century of the life sciences”7 the statute makes significant strides towards protecting individuals from 
discrimination based on their genetic information. 
 
 This article argues that GINA theoretically protects people from genetic discrimination in insurance 
coverage and in employment; however, its true legacy will be assuring the American public that taking genetic tests 
will not invite sanctions from either insurance providers or employers. Congress, aware of the imminent expansion 
of genetic technologies and applications has protected future generations of people whose medical care will involve 
ever increasing amounts of genetic information.
8
 Contrary to the arguments of a few critics, GINA effectively 
protects important privacy rights of people while avoiding burdening businesses with frivolous requirements. 
Beginning in Part II of this article, we offer a short history of the study of genetics as well as a history of the abuses 
of genetic sciences. Part III recounts the legislative history of attempts to pass genetic information nondiscrimination 
laws, including the history of GINA. Part IV comprehensively examines the statute’s primary provisions relating to 
insurance and employment, evaluating criticisms of the statute. 
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II.  GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND ISSUES 
 
a. Technology 
 
 According to several sources, the modern study of genetics began in 1953 when Francis Crick and James 
Watson discovered the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
9
 Noting the potential for 
advancement in the field of genetics, in 1988 Congress funded the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) for a project to explore genes.
10
 The Human Genome Project officially started in 1990 
and is now part of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), a subsection of NIH.
11
 After several 
revisions of its timeline for completing mapping the entire human gene sequence, the HGP announced in April 2003 
that it had successfully mapped the human genome, two years ahead of schedule.
12
 The HGP found around 20,500 
different genes, while another scientist claims there might exist as many as 3.2 billion base pairs of DNA.
13
 Since all 
diseases have a genetic component,
14
 the mapping of the human genome could potentially affect methods of 
treatment and diagnosis for every disease. 
 
 The decoding of the human genome has been a monumental achievement in the treatment of many 
diseases. Genetic diseases tend to fall into one of three categories for the purposes of determining whether an 
individual will develop the disease or not.
15
 Monogentic conditions are those in which the existence or absence of 
the gene indicate to a certainty that an individual will develop a particular disease.
16
 Multifactoral conditions are 
those in which environmental factors play a much larger role.
17
 Usually, genetic tests of multifactoral cases will 
result in a “positive predictive value” (PPV) that estimates the individual’s chances of developing the disease or 
disorder.
18
 Depending on factors other than genetics, the individual will or will not get the disease.
19
 The last type of 
conditions exists when an individual carries a gene which normally would cause a disease, but a “good” gene 
balances it out, rendering the gene harmless.
20
 However, the gene might be passed along to offspring, and if the 
“good” gene is not passed along with it, the offspring might develop the disease.21 Finding a gene or the absence of a 
gene, then, allows health professionals to predict the chances of an individual developing a particular disease. 
Predicting the existence of a disease allows a doctor to suggest lifestyle changes suited toward avoiding the 
manifestation of the disease.
22
 Diabetes, heart disease, Parkinson’s disease, bipolar illness, and asthma are just a few 
of the diseases that genetic information has and will help to identify and treat.
23
 
 
 In addition to merely predicting possible future disease an individual may develop, the results of genetic 
testing sometimes offer doctors accurate predictors of which treatments will or will not be beneficial to treat a 
manifested disease. In addition, genetic knowledge may lead to the creation of genetically engineered organs for 
transplants.
24
 
 
b.  The Need For Protective Legislation 
 
 While genetic sciences have offered spectacular advances in the medical field, the blemished societal 
record warns of the potential for current and future abuse.
25
 One of the first uses of the study of hereditary traits was 
to assign value to some traits and not to others. Those who held traits that society deemed “valuable” were 
encouraged to reproduce, while those with “poor” genes were discouraged.26 In many instances, this discouragement 
took the form of government-sponsored sterilizations. 
 
 Among the earliest influences of the eugenicist movement, albeit inadvertently, was Charles Darwin and 
his support of the “survival of the fittest” theory of evolution.27 As people began to apply this random theory (out of 
context) to human society, they claimed some traits as fit and some as non-fit. As one commentator notes, 
“[Darwin’s] observations of nature…provided powerful groups with the assumed objectivity of science as a neutral 
justification for their supremacy over less popular and weaker segments of society.”28 Hereditarians, later called 
eugenicists, began to discount the influence of one’s environment on an individual’s development, therefore 
believing, for instance, that an individual’s propensity for becoming a murderer like his or her propensity to have 
blue eyes was based on traits passed down from parents.
29
 Unfortunately, as the eugenics movement gained 
momentum, the public saw lesser and lesser need for social reform based on rehabilitation, believing such reform to 
be nonproductive.
30
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 Due to the prevalence of eugenicist views, the sterilization movement gained momentum, and with the help 
of government action. As a first step toward sterilization in 1896, Connecticut passed a law prohibiting “an epileptic, 
an imbecile or feebleminded” person to have certain sexual relations.31 In 1907, Indiana passed a statute requiring 
the sterilization of many criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists, followed by similar laws in fourteen more states.
32
 
In 1927, even the Supreme Court ruled that some sterilizations were constitutional as Justice Holmes sententiously 
opined, “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”33 
 
 Beginning in the 1920’s, eugenicist views began fading due largely to three criticisms of the movement. 
The first was that eugenicists relied too heavily on hereditary factors for their health and behavioral determiners.
34
 
Studies began to surface that demonstrated that even one with a propensity to develop a certain disorder, given 
environmental factors, may either never develop the disorder or may be able to treat it.
35
 Second, the scientific data 
compiled to support eugenicist theory lacked credible measurements and methodology, often basing conclusions on 
presumptions or on too little empirical evidence.
36
 The third primary criticism addressed the racist undertones of 
many of the eugenicist conclusions.
37
 As minority groups resisted the conclusions of eugenicists and as Americans 
witnessed the aftermath of the Nazi’s Third Reich, many tried to distance themselves from eugenicist theories.38 
 
 Public fears about the use of genetic information result from much more recent abuses as well. In the 
1970’s, many employers began screening people for sickle cell anemia, a genetic disease afflicting African-
Americans.
39
 Unsubstantiated opinions of the time asserted that carriers of the disease, healthy individuals that 
tested positive for the sickle cell trait but showed no symptoms sickle cell anemia, would be more susceptible to 
certain hazards, including benzene, lead, carbon monoxide, and other chemicals.
40
 States began requiring screening 
for the disease in all African-Americans.
41
 When the confidentiality of these records was breached, even healthy 
carriers of the trait were burdened with a stigma.
42
 In addition, many were denied employment or health and life 
insurance do to their genetic diagnosis.
43
 Congress passed the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act in 1972, 
which instituted programs across the country to screen and treat people.
44
 The government conditioned its funding 
for the programs on the stipulation that the screening process was to be voluntary.
45
 In addition, any knowledge 
obtained through the programs was to be confidential.
46
 The sickle cell dilemma of the 1970’s shared several traits 
with the eugenicist movement earlier in the century. Because the sickle cell trait was linked to race, any process 
singling out carriers of the disease was discrimination based on race. In addition, the discrimination against carriers 
of the sickle cell trait was based on poor scientific evidence. Studies did not support the proposition that carriers 
were more susceptible to environmental toxins.
47
 
 
 Up until the early 1990’s, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory tested its employees for sickle cell trait, syphilis, 
and pregnancy using urine and blood samples without the consent of the employees.
48
 In Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the plaintiffs challenged the practice under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), federal constitutional right to privacy, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
49
 Although the 
plaintiffs failed on the ADA claim, they prevailed on the right to privacy issue because of the sensitive nature of 
medical information and the lack of consent.
50
 They also successfully argued the Title VII claim due to the race- and 
sex-based testing of potential employees as a condition of employment.
51
 While the court did recognize a 
constitutionally protected right to privacy, the court’s holding is most likely limited. Since it was a constitutional 
issue, the holding only applies to government employees, so private employees would still be susceptible to 
discrimination of this sort.
52
 In addition, the testing was conducted without consent.
53
 Where an employee gives 
explicit or implicit consent, an employer could plausibly use genetic information for any purpose in the absence of 
legislation to protect the abuse of the information. 
 
 Another similar case occurred in Iowa when employees of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad 
complained that the railroad was administering genetic tests on employees who had carpel tunnel syndrome 
injuries.
54
 The employer either conducted the tests without the knowledge of the employees or asked the employees 
to consent to them.
55
 The Railroad was searching for a gene it believed sometimes caused carpel tunnel syndrome.
56
 
The EEOC filed the complaint on behalf of the employees in February of 2001 basing their claim on the ADA.
57
 In 
May of 2002, the EEOC settled with the company in mediation agreements.
58
 The EEOC’s position was that genetic 
testing was unlawful under the ADA because the testing did not relate to the job because the tests have no 
application to the present ability of an employee to perform a job.
59
 Presumably, the Railroad could have used the 
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results of future tests to either fire employees with the undesirable gene or to place employees in different job 
placements because of the gene.
60
 In either case, the Railroad would have been using genetic information as a basis 
of discriminating against employees for a disease that had not manifested itself yet. 
 
 Employment practices raise special concerns. According to a study in 2002, one percent of employers were 
testing for Sickle Cell Anemia and .4 percent for Huntington’s disease.61 Twenty percent of employers attempted to 
obtain medical histories.
62
 These statistics suggest that, while few cases of genetic discrimination exist,
63
 the 
potential for abuse is large and could continue to grow with the expansion of new technologies. 
 
 The nation’s poor historical record of reckless and discriminatory abuses of personal genetic information 
lingers in the minds of the populace today.
64
 The eugenics movement discriminated against people on the basis of 
hereditary traits, often using science as an excuse for racism. Since eugenics has faded as a viable movement, 
genetic information has been used to discriminate against people in at least a few documented cases. Modern genetic 
science advances, with their ability to accurately map traits of an individual and link genes to certain diseases, 
increase the risk that entities will use genetic information for predictive value even when no disease is manifest.
65
 
The work of the HGP has and will continue to greatly expand the predictive value of genetic information, making it 
valuable information for entities financially invested in an individual’s future. Employers will often be interested in 
genetic information for the purposes of placing an employee, whether to hire an employee, to keep workers 
compensation costs down, or to attempt to predict employee future productivity.
66
 Insurance providers will be 
interested for the purposes of setting premium and contribution rates and for determining an individual’s eligibility 
for a plan. As Francis S. Collins explained, “Unless Americans are convinced that their genetic information will not 
be used against them, the era of personalized medicine may never come to pass.”67 
 
 Although some have claimed that they have been discriminated against by employers or insurers, the 
evidence is largely anecdotal.
68
 Even the Congressional Budget Office predicts that the GINA legislation will only 
impact six hundred people directly each year.
69
 However, much evidence exists that suggests the public remains 
cynical over how entities will use their genetic information once a health professional collects it.
70
 In a 2007 study 
conducted by the Genetics and Public Policy Center at John Hopkins University, a public opinion poll revealed 92% 
of those in the study believed that genetic information gleaned from tests “could be used in ways that are harmful to 
the person.”71 Very few of those respondents supported the use of genetic tests for the purposes of deciding 
insurance premiums or of making hiring and promotion employment decisions.
72
 However, an overwhelming 
majority support genetic testing for the purposes of diagnosing, preventing, or treating diseases.
73
 This discrepancy 
demonstrates that the public generally values genetic testing for the purposes of medical procedures and research, 
but not for insurance and employment decisions.
74
 The study concludes, “this enthusiasm about genetic testing [for 
health purposes] is tempered by widespread public concern and distrust about the discrimination that could result if 
insurers and employers access and use genetic test results.”75 In addition, the Human Genome Project has 
recognized the potential for abuse resulting from the new technologies and has cited it as an area of great concern.
76
 
 
 While the purpose of GINA is certainly to protect individuals from discrimination, the law serves the 
broader purpose of attempting to eliminate fear that many may have of getting genetic tests administered.
77
 If the 
new law assures the public that their genetic information resulting from genetic tests will not be used to increase the 
cost of insurance, to deny eligibility for an insurance plan, or to determine job placement or other employment 
decisions, people will be much more likely to take advantage of the expanding science to help prevent, diagnose, 
and treat diseases, contributing to the nation’s health.78 While few statistical studies suggest that many employers or 
insurance companies actually discriminate on the basis of genetic information, the public response to the potential 
for these abuses is clear.
79
 Laws protecting individuals from genetic discrimination will assure them that when they 
undergo genetic testing, employers and insurance companies will not use those results to discriminate against them. 
 
 In addition to popular opinion on the matter, traditional legal concepts indicate the government should 
legislate at least minimum safeguards protecting the use of a person’s genetic information. An individual’s genetic 
makeup shares similar vulnerabilities to discrimination as other categories that the Constitution and statutes 
currently protect. For instance, one’s genetic makeup is immutable like gender and race.80 In addition, genetic 
discrimination results from a predisposition to a disease, not from the actual manifestation of disease.
81
 Similar to 
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stereotypes of one’s race or gender, discrimination because of genetics results from an assumption that might or 
might not be accurate, but an assumption that is nonetheless based on conjecture.
82
 This speculation, if not 
restrained, could subject many people who possess a specific genetic indicator to discrimination even though they 
will never develop the feared disorder or disease.
83
 
 
c.  Current Legislation 
 
 Congress has passed protective measures in the past that might cover some kinds of discrimination based 
on genetic information. Most applicable to genetic information are the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and the Social Security Act (SSA).
84
 
 
 The ADA offers partial protection against genetic discrimination because it attempts to prevent 
discrimination directed at a person with a disability or at a person who seems to have a disability.
85
 In the context of 
employment, the ADA covers private employers who employ fifteen or more employees.
86
 However, many critics 
have pointed out its shortcomings. For instance, the ADA only protects against an employer abusing genetic 
information, but does not prevent the employer from acquiring this information.
87
 Enforcement of the use of genetic 
information is logistically much more difficult than limiting the acquisition of these materials. An employer, 
whether hiring or firing, might base a decision on genetic information while purporting to have some other more 
legitimate motivation. Preventing employers from accessing this information in the first place minimizes the chances 
that it will be used for discriminatory purposes.
88
 
 
 The ADA might also apply in the insurance context but the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether 
the act prohibits discrimination based on genetic information for the purposes of eligibility and premiums for 
insurance programs.
89
 Although the ADA affords some protection in the employment context, the possibility exists 
that it will not apply to insurance companies for underwriting purposes.
90
 
 
 HIPAA does provide some protections against abuse for the insured or those seeking to be insured. 
Although the application is only to group health plans (not individual health plans), it protects against an insurer 
raising the cost of premiums or denying coverage to an individual based his or her genetic information.
91
 In addition, 
HIPAA protects individuals by requiring that insurance companies not treat genetic information as preexisting 
conditions until a disorder or disease manifests itself.
92
 However, even under HIPAA, a group insurer is allowed to 
increase rates for the entire group based on the genetic information of an individual or individuals.
93
 The act does 
not protect subscribers to individual health plans, only group plans, nor does it apply to large employers.
94
 Nor does 
HIPAA prohibit insurers from requiring subscribers to take genetic tests or from disclosing genetic information.
95
 In 
summary, while HIPAA protects individuals from rate increases if they are in a group plan based on genetic 
information, it does not prevent using this information to increase the collective rate of the group, to assess premium 
rates and eligibility of individuals under group plans sponsored by large employers, or to assess premium rates and 
eligibility of individuals in individual health plans. 
 
 HIPAA also protects the confidentiality of certain types of medical information and the Health and Human 
Services regulation provide adequate protection for many types of information.
96
 However, these regulations are 
limited by the organic statute that allows regulations only as they apply to providers, payers, and information 
clearinghouses, not to any other category.
97
 Any entities besides those in the three listed categories, then, are not 
statutorily required to protect genetic information.
98
 
 
 Under SSA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) governs supplemental insurance 
polices, or Medigap policies.
99
 Individuals on certain Medicare plans can purchase Medigap plans to cover some of 
the gaps in the Medicare insurance.
100
 Under ERISA, the Medigap policies cannot discriminate against an applicant 
in premiums or eligibility for most any health related reason, including general health status.
101
 No court so far has 
addressed whether or not genetic information falls into this category,
102
 but given the broad language, it probably 
does. This most likely insures that those who want or have Medigap policies will not face discrimination related to 
those policies based on their genetic information. 
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III.  HISTORY OF THE CURRENT LEGISLATION 
 
 Congressional consideration of provisions to protect the way entities used genetic information began in the 
mid-1990s. In 1995, Representative Slaughter introduced the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health 
Insurance Act of 1995.
103
 In the next year, the same Congress passed HIPAA, another provisions addressing the 
misuse of medical information protecting against the “discrimination against an individual in a group based on 
health status, including genetic information.”104 In the 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses, Representative Slaughter 
again introduced genetic information nondiscrimination bills addressing discrimination in employment context or 
the insurance industry or both.
105
 In 2003 in the 108th Congress, Slaughter introduced a similar bill again, and this 
time it was referred to committees, and the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations held a hearing 
examining the affect of the proposed bill on the workplace.
106
 Around the same time, Senator Snowe introduced 
comparable legislation in the Senate, which was approved by a vote of 95 to 0, but the House took no action.
107
 
Representative Biggert introduced the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005 in the 109th, but again 
the body took no action.
108
 In that same Congress, the Senate passed Senator Snowe’s version of the bill with a vote 
of 98 to 0 but the House held it at the desk.
109
 
 
 Finally, in January of 2007, Slaughter introduced a bill into the House of Representatives to protect genetic 
information that would become law.
110
 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 is virtually the same 
bill that ended up passing both houses of Congress, with minor changes.
111
 During the 110th Congress, the bill was 
referred to several committees and subcommittees.
112
 The House of Representatives passed the bill on April 25, 
2007 with a vote of 420 to 3.
113
 Senator Snowe introduced a similar bill, although with notable differences, in the 
Senate in the same Congress.
114
 The Senate passed a slightly different version of the House bill on April 24, 2008 
with a unanimous vote, and then the House agreed to the Senate amendment on May 1, 2008 with a vote of 414 to 
1.
115
 President Bush signed the act into law on May 21, 2008.
116
 
 
IV.  PROVISIONS OF GINA 
 
 GINA is divided into three different titles. The first addresses the use of genetic information in the health 
care industry. The second proscribes certain uses and requests for genetic information by employers. The final title 
contains miscellaneous provisions, the most substantive of which provide harsher penalties for violations of child 
labor laws. Introducing the legislation is an extensive preamble that outlines the progress made in medical 
technologies due to the expansion of genetic knowledge, the history of genetic discrimination in the country, the 
close relationship between genetic discrimination and racial discrimination, and the current need for protections for 
genetic information. 
 
a.  Title I: Genetic Information And Health Insurance 
 
 Title I amends ERISA, the Public Health Services Act, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and the SSA. 
Among these various amendments, GINA applies to insurers of both group and individual plans, filling many of the 
gaps left by previous legislation. Generally, the statute prohibits issuers of both group plans and individual plans 
from using genetic information to set or adjust premium or contribution rates.
117
 For group plans, this means that 
insurers, while they currently may not adjust the rates of an individual in a group plan based on genetic 
information,
118
 now may not adjust the rates for groups based on the genetic information of an individual in that 
group.
119
 In addition, while ERISA already prohibited the use of genetic information in the determination of 
eligibility for group plans,
120
 GINA extends this protection to individual plans and to Medicare supplemental plans 
under Medigap.
121
 In sum, GINA fully protects individuals in group plans and individual plans from an issuer of a 
policy using genetic information either to set premium or contribution rates or to determine eligibility for a plan. 
 
 The protections extend even further. GINA also has provisions to prevent insurers from getting genetic 
information about enrollees or potential enrollees. Subject to an exception, issuers of policies shall not “request or 
require an individual or a family member of such individual to undergo a genetic test.”122 The only exception to this 
provision is when an insurer, for the purpose of research, may request (but not require) a participant to take a genetic 
test.
123
 When conducting this research, the issuer of the policy must inform the participant that the test is voluntary 
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and that the results will not affect premiums or eligibility, the issuer must notify the Secretary about the request for 
tests, and the issuer must comply with any other requirements the Secretary might mandate.
124
 Issuers likewise are 
prohibited from any attempts to obtain genetic information for the purposes of setting premium or contribution rates 
or of determining eligibility.
125
 However, issuers of policies are permitted to obtain genetic information for other 
purposes.
126
 While the provision most likely attempts to protect an insurer from the incidental collection of genetic 
information, it allows collection of this information as long as the collection was not for the purposes of 
underwriting.
127
 GINA protects potential enrollees in a similar way by prohibiting the collection of genetic 
information prior to enrollment if the collection is “in connection with such enrollment.”128 
 
The title broadly defines “genetic information” to include information obtained through genetic tests of an 
individual or of an individual’s family members, as well as information of a manifested disease in an individual’s 
family member.
129
 This broad definition prohibits an insurer from using the disease of a family member as a 
consideration in setting premium rates or in determining eligibility. Furthermore, the act extends to protect the 
genetic information of fetuses and of legally possessed embryos.
130
 
 
Section 105 extends HIPAA privacy protections to genetic information. This provision classifies genetic 
information as “health information,” which is already subject to protection under HIPAA.131 
 
The penalties for noncompliance differ depending on which department oversees the entity in violation for 
either group plans or individual plans.
132
 Generally, GINA allows the Secretary of the department to impose a 
penalty against a violating entity of one hundred dollars a day per person during which the entity is in violation.
133
 
The minimum penalty is $2,500, unless the violation or violations result in more than de minimis injury, in which 
case the minimum fine shall be $15,000.
134
 In addition to secretarial enforcement, GINA offers individuals a private 
right of action because of the act’s incorporation into existing statutes.135 Violations of the privacy provisions will be 
in accord with Title I of HIPAA.
136
 Since the statute was enacted on May 21, 2008, all the provisions of Title I shall 
take effect on May 21, 2009.
137
 
 
Critics of the insurance provisions of GINA argue that instead of encouraging people to undertake genetic 
testing, Title I will actually discourage the testing.
138
 Because an insurance company is now unable to request or 
require an enrollee to take a genetic test, an enrollee might not take a test the results of which might prevent further 
illness.
139
 Instead of encouraging genetic testing in an effort to promote health, these critics argue that the 
unintended consequences serve the opposite purpose. However, the research, as noted above, indicates that a 
majority of Americans already fear taking genetic tests because of how insurers or employers might use that 
information. While the provisions of Title I may inadvertently discourage a few people from taking genetic tests, 
many others will take these tests under the assurance that insurers will not use the information to increase their 
premiums or to disqualify them from coverage. 
 
b.  Title II: Genetic Information And Employment 
 
 Title II of GINA generally prevents employers, employment agencies, joint labor-management committees, 
and labor agencies from discriminating against employees or members based on genetic information.
140
 Using the 
same definitions as in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “employer” defines an entity that employs at least fifteen 
employees.
141
 “Genetic information” consists of the same information as GINA denotes in Title I: information from 
genetic tests, information from the genetic tests of family members, and information about the manifestation of a 
disease in family members.
142
 Also as in Title I, manifested diseases or disorders in an individual do not constitute 
genetic information.
143
 In addition, Title II of GINA also considers a request for genetic services as genetic 
information in itself, so that a covered entity may not discriminate against an employee or member due to a request 
for these services.
144
 
 
 For employers, Title II prohibits making choices to hire, discharge, or discriminate against “any employee 
with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of genetic information; 
nor shall an employee, because of genetic information of employees, classify or segregate them in a way that would 
limit their employment opportunities.
145
 Much like Title I with the issuers of insurance, Title II attempts to prevent 
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the employer from accessing the information at all. The statute prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or 
purchasing genetic information about an employee.
146
 However, because of the nature of the employer-employee 
relationship, Congress wrote in several exceptions to an employer’s acquisition of genetic information. An employer 
may acquire this information when the information is obtained through an employer-provided wellness program, but 
only if the employee signs a written agreement voluntarily and with knowledge of his or her rights, and if 
individually identifiable information remains undisclosed.
147
 An employer may also obtain genetic information if in 
order to comply with state medical leave provisions or the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
148
 Employers can 
access an employee’s genetic information if the information is in any publicly available document, and can access 
the information if the employer is conducting DNA analysis for forensic law enforcement purposes.
149
 If an 
employer must monitor the effects of toxic substances in the workplace on the health of employees using genetic 
information, the employer may obtain the information only when the employer provides written notice to the 
employee, the employee voluntarily submits to the testing or the testing is required by law, the employee receives 
the monitoring results of the test, the employer does not receive personally identifiable information about individual 
employees, and the monitoring is in compliance with genetic monitoring regulations.
150
 Most importantly, Congress 
recognized that employment relationships do not exist in a vacuum. The “water-cooler” exception allows an 
employer to obtain genetic information of an employee inadvertently.
151
 An employer, because of this exception, 
will not be held responsible for an employee, for instance, discussing an illness in the family with the employer. 
 
 The prohibitions for employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs are similar to those 
for employers. Employment agencies are prohibited from using genetic information to attempt to get an employer to 
discriminate against an employee.
152
 Labor organizations are prohibited from excluding or expelling from 
membership because of genetic information, and like employment agencies, may not attempt to get an employer to 
discriminate against someone because of the information.
153
 In addition, each of these entities (employer, 
employment agency, and labor organization) is prohibited from discriminating against a member or employee based 
on genetic information in training program opportunities.
154
 
 
 Title II also protects the privacy of genetic information. GINA treats genetic information in an employee’s 
file as a “confidential medical record” as defined in the ADA, requiring that medical information be kept in a file 
separate from the general personnel files.
155
 This genetic information may only be disclosed under certain 
circumstances. An employee or member may issue a written request for the information.
156
 A health researcher may 
access these records pursuant to Federal regulations.
157
 If a court orders the disclosure of the information, the 
employer or labor organization may release only as much information as is ordered, and must notify the employee or 
member of the information disclosed.
158
 Employers may also release the information for an investigation of a claim 
under GINA, for proof of an employee’s compliance with family and medical leave laws, and for a health agency 
investigating a contagious disease, but for this last the employer may only release information about a manifested 
disease in a family member of an employee.
159
 
 
 Enforcement of Title II is described in section 207. The enforcement regime for employers is the same as it 
is under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
160
 An employee must file with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) before filing with a court and will be entitled to the remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a.
161
 However, some variation exists among the remedies depending on how the certain employer is 
classified.
162
 Section 208 excludes disparate impact as a cause of action for the purposes of GINA, although the act 
directs a commission to explore the possibility of incorporating this cause of action six years after the enactment of 
the act. Title II will take effect eighteen months after the enactment of the bill: November 21, 2009.
163
 
 
 Some critics have voiced concern over Title II of GINA. First, many are worried that GINA creates a new 
cause of action against employers that might result either in frivolous lawsuits or employer liability for only minor 
infractions.
164
 Under GINA, an employee might have a cause of action if an employer files papers incorrectly even 
absent any actual discrimination.
165
 While this is plausibly true, it is no more a danger than under ADA. Because 
recordkeeping requirements mimic the requirements of other confidential documents, GINA makes the transition as 
easy as possible for the employer. Other critics complain that since GINA only preempts less restrictive state laws 
while more restrictive state laws are still enforceable, the Federal legislation creates an unworkable “patchwork” of 
laws across the country, compliance with which will be difficult for national insurance companies and employers.
166
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However, before GINA existed, the patchwork was even more extensive. GINA preempts all state laws that are less 
restrictive. This inevitably creates a more uniform system. Had GINA attempted to preempt all state genetic 
discrimination laws, it would lower the standards in many states. Since both Title I and Title II of GINA adapt to 
already existing legislation, issuers of insurance and employers already have systems in place for compliance. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 GINA might have significant effects on insurers and employers, but Congress did well to balance the 
competing concerns of genetic discrimination and administrative burdens. Insurers, while few discriminate based on 
genetic information currently, might have, in the future, used advanced technologies to fit genetic profiles into 
actuarial tables. Since GINA now will preclude insurers from doing so, the insurance industry may lack data that it 
believes will make insurance coverage more efficient. Some argue that since insurance companies may use other 
indicators, such as a manifested disease, to determine premiums and eligibility, they should be permitted to use 
genetic information. However, the determination that genetic information is different from other types of 
information is not random. The close relationship between genetic information and race, for instance, makes clear 
the fears about abuse of the information. Furthermore, the history of abuse of such information forebodes similar 
mistakes in the future. 
 
 GINA also leverages a burden on employers. Employers must now keep confidential certain information 
that before they did not. Such information might include something as seemingly innocuous as information about 
relatives of an employee. Harmless errors might subject an employer to lawsuits. While this in itself is a burden, it 
differs little from the ADA requirements already in place. The restrictions ensure that employers will not make 
decisions based on a prediction of the future that may or may not be accurate. 
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